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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS PHILLIP A. BULLEN,
JAY R. BINGHAM, 0.C. HAMMOND, JAY DEE
HARRIS, BEVERLY D. KUMPFER, SNELL OLSEN,
REX G. PLOWMAN, W.B. ROBINS, ALVA C.
SNOW, WILLIAM R. STOCKDALE, JANE S.
TIBBALS, GLENN L. TAGGART, DEE A. BROADBENT
and L. MARK NEUBERGER

NATURE OF THE CASE
1.

The Primary Action

This action was commenced by plaintiff-respondent Utah State
University (hereinafter "the University") in December, 1975 to
recover losses and expenses allegedly sustained by the University in
connection with its purchase and sale of various securities between
December, 1971 and September, 1972.

The University seeks to recover

losses and expenses which it allegedly incurred in connection with
stock transactions executed by Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes,
Inc.

(hereinafter "Hornblower") on the University's behalf.

The

University contends that it is entitled to recover from Hornblower
because the transactions were ultra vires.
2.

The Third Party Action

In addition to denying liability in the primary action, Hornblower
filed a third-party complaint in August, 1977 seeking indemnity or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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contribution from a number of other entities and individuals.~;
Among the individuals named as third party defendants were officials at the University who allegedly authorized the investments in
question.

Those individuals included members of University's

Institutional CouncilVand several of the University's administratorsV (hereinafter referred to as "Respondents").
This brief is respectfully submitted in the captioned action on
behalf of the following individual Respondents Phillip A. Bullen,
Jay R. Bingham,

o.c.

Hammond, Jay Dee Harris, Beverly D. Kumpfer,

Snell Olsen, Rex G. Plowman,

w.

B. Robins, Alva Snow, William

Stockdale, Jane S. Tibbals, Glenn L. Taggart, Dee A. Broadbent, and
L. Mark Neuberger in response to Hornblower's opening brief.!_;

y

Apart from the Appel lees involved in these appeals, Hornblower's
third party complaint also asserted claims against the State, the
Institutional Council, and a bank which had acted as transfer agent
in the security transactions at issue.
Hornblower's claim against the
foregoing entities were dismissed by the trial court Hornblower
has apparently chosen not to appeal those rulings.

V

Phillip A. Bullen, Jay R. Bingham, o.c. Hammond, Jay Dee Harris,
Beverly D. Kumpfer, Snell Olsen, Rex G. Plowman, W.B. Robins, Alva Snow/
William Stockdale, and Jane s. Tibbals were Institutional Council
'
members during the period in question.

V

The University Administrators were Glenn L. Taggart (President),
Dee A. Broadbent (Vice-President for Business Affairs) and L. Mark
Neuberger (Secretary to the University's Institutional Council)
The third-party complaints also named Donald A. Catron, another
administrator who actually ran the investment program on a
day-to-day basis, as a defendant. Mr. Catron is separately
represented.

V

By order of this Court dated March 20, 1979, the appeals in this
action were consolidated with the appeals in four similar cases.
Hornblower's opening brief was also submitted on behalf of stockbrokers in three of those other cases.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
These Respondents moved to dismiss Hornblower's third-party
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

On March 21, 1978,

the trial court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss after extensive briefing and oral argument.

The trial court certified its

ruling as final for the purposes of appeal on January 3, 1979.
The trial court also entered various orders in the primary
action between the University and Hornblower, from which Hornblower
is presently appealing and which are described in Hornblower's
brief.:.J Those issues to .not directly relate to these Respondents
and are, accordingly, not addressed in this brief.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
These Respondents seek affirmance of the trial court's order
dismissing Hornblower's third-party complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Each of the individual Respondents on whose behalf this
brief is submitted either held a position on the Institutional
Council of Utah State University or held a position as an upper
level administrator at the University during the period of the
investment program in question.

The Institutional Council

~/Hornblower's brief, p. 1-2.
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members were largely chosen from the members of the community,
while the administrators were essentially professionals in the
field of education.

By virtue of their positions, the

Respondents were responsible for supervising most of the Unisity operations.

concerned the University.

Those responsibilites

encompassed a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from supervision
of athletic and academic programs to supervision of the University's
property and financial affairs.
Hornblower has laid out an elaborate and lengthy statement
of facts in its brief which describes the involvement of these
Respondents in the investment program in issue. Although that
statement of facts contains much that should properly be labeled
argument, no purpose would be served by attempting to identify the
inaccuracies or to separate the fact from conjecture in the
Hornblower brief, because the position of these Respondents with
respect to the facts in this case is determined by the procedural
posture of the case.

This is an appeal by Hornblower from the

dismissal of its third-party complaint.

As such the relevant facts

are those which were alleged in that third-party complaint.
In its third-party complaint Hornblower alleged the
following as the factual predicate for its claims against
these Respondents:
1.
Hornblower alleged that these Respondents approved
one or more resolutions which represented that the
University had authority to purchase and sell securities.

-4-
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The resolutions designated Donald Catron as one of
the individuals who was empowered to direct purchases and sales of securities on the University's
behalf.
(R. 475).
2.

Hornblower further alleged that these Respondents

ra~ified Ca~ron's actions by reviewing periodic reports

which described the transactions Catron had entered
into on the University's behalf (R. 476).
3.
Hornblower further alleged that it relied upon the
foregoing actions by these Appellees in executing the
securities transactions in question on the University's
behalf (R. 477).
Solely for the purposes of this appeal, the factual allegations of Hornblower's third-party complaint will be treated as
though true.~/
It is Respondents' position that the trial court properly
dismissed Hornblower's third-party complaint for the reasons
set forth in the following sections of this brief.

~In its brief, Hornblower incorrectly contends that the Court
must al so treat as true the following allegations:
( 1) that
Appellees exceeded their statutory authority in authorizing or
ratifying the securities transactions in issue and (2) allegations
that Appellees' actions gave rise to an express or implied agreement
to indemnify Hornblower against liability arising out of the
transactions in question.
Appellees submit those allegations are
conclusions of law which are not admitted by a motion to dismiss.
E.g. ~ v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974); Mirin v.
Justices of the Nevada Supreme Court, 415 F.Supp.
1178, 1181
(D.Nev.1976) (construing identical federal rule).
Even i f true,
however, those allegations would not be sufficient to state a cause
of action against Appellees, for the reasons set forth in the
following sections of this brief.
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-ARGUMENT

;i

I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
HORNBLOWER'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THESE INDIVIDUAL
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

A.

As Public Officials, These Respondents
Are Entitled To Immunity For Acts Performed
In Good Faith And Within The Scope Of
Their Duties

!'

Public officials, both in Utah and elsewhere, have long enjoyed
a qualified immunity from suits growing out of the performance of
their duties.

~Barr

v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 575, 79 S.Ct. 1335

(1959); Board of Education of Nebo School District v. Jeppson, 74
Utah 576, 280 P. 1069 (1929)

Such immunity has been deemed necessary

to assure that public officials are free to exercise their duties
unencumbered by the fear of damage suits growing out of the
performance of their duties -- suits which consume time and energy
letter devoted to public service and which deter competent
individuals from assuming the responsibi- ities of public office.
Anderson v.Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 413 P.2d 597
(1966); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 340-41 (1973).
The scope of immunity to which particular officials are
entitled varies, depending on the nature of the officials'
responsibilities.

Barr v. Matteo, 360

u.s.

575, 79 s.ct. 1335

(1959); Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).
Officials such as Respondents, who are charged with a wide range

-6-
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of duties and responsibilities that require the exercise of judgment
and discretion, must be and are accorded a relatively broad form
of immunity.

Smith v.

~'

485 F.2d at 343-344.

This Court has, accordingly, recognized the need for such
protection.

It has repeatedly extended immunity to officials charged

with discretionary duties.

~

Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d

312, 445 P.2d 367 (1968); Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241
P.2d 907 (1952).

So long as such officials have acted in good

faith and within the scope of the matters committed to their supervision or control, they have been accorded immunity. Anderson v.
Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d at 407, 413 P.2d at 599 (1966);
Board of Education of Nebo School District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576,
280 P. 1069 (1929); Prosser, The Law of Torts, Sec. 132 pp. 988-991
{4th Ed. 1971); 4 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 12.208.
As this Court has succinctly stated:
... it is the settled policy of the law that when
a public official acts in go0d faith, believing
what he does to be within the scope of his authority
and in the line of his duty, he is not liable for
damages even if he makes a mistake in the exercise
of his judgment.
Anderson v. Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d at 407, 413 P.2d at 599.
In these related actions Respondents' official immunity fully
justified dismissal of Hornblower's third-party complaint.

Horn-

blower's complaint sought to hold Respondents personally liable for
actions which Respondents took in supervising the University's
financial affairs.

Yet that complaint utterly failed to allege

facts sufficient to impose personal liability on Respondents.

-7-
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Hornblower could not and did not allege that Appellees had ever
acted in bad faith.

The undisputed fact is that Respondents were at

all times acting in good faith.

Nor could Hornblower allege that

Respondents had acted outside the scope of their duties, for the
responsibility of overseeing investment Of the University's funds
one of the many duties imposed upon Respondents by statute.

lS

Utah Code

Annotated Secs. 53-48-10(5); 53-48-20(3).2/
In short, Hornblower's third-party complaint did not allege
facts which would justify stripping Respondents of their immunity for
actions which they took in a good faith effort to carry out their
duties.

Respondents respectfully submit, therefore, that the trial

court properly dismissed Hornblower's third-party complaint.

B.

Respondents Are Er.titled To Immunity
Even If They Inadvertently Exceeded
Their Authority, Because ~hey were
Acting In Good Faith And Within The
Scope Of Their Duties

In its brief Hornblower has recognized the existence of the
official immunity doctrine.

However, Hornblower has argued that

Respondents are not entitled to immunity in these actions because
Respondents "exceeded their authority" by authorizing investments

2J

U.C.A.Sec.53-48-10(5) (1970) provides, in relevant part, that
each university may handle its own financial affairs under the
general supervision of the Board of Hia~er Education, which has
delegated such duties to the Institutional Council.
U.C.A. Sec.53-48-20(3)(1970) provioes, :..: relevant part, that an
institution may retain, accumulate, invest, commit and expend
funds received for research programs authorized by the Board.
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which were later determined to be ultra vires.~/ Hornblower's
apparent contention that public officials may be held personally
liable whenever they exceed their authority seriously
misconstrues the limits of the immunity doctrine.
The primary flaw in Hornblower's argument is its failure to
acknowledge that an official may unwittingly exceed his authority
while still acting within the scope of the matters committed to
his supervision or control.

As noted above, the scope of an

official's immunity is determined by the nature of the official's
responsibilities.

Officials such as Respondents, whose duties

require the exercise of judgment and discretion, enjoy a broader
form of immunity than those officials and employees whose duties
are purely ministerial in nature.

Connell v. Tooele City, 572

P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1977); Board of Education of Nebo School
District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P.1065, 1069 (1929); Smith
v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 342-43 (10th Cir. 1973); Prosser, The
Law of Torts, Sec. 132, pp. 988-989 (4th Ed. 1971).

Courts do

not permit officials who are charged with discretionary
responsibilities to be held liable simply because they have
inadvertently "exceeded their authority."
Instead, as the Supreme Court long ago noted, "A distinction
must be ..• observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear

2'.J

Hornblower brief, p. 70-73. This Court determined that such
transactions were ultra vires in 1975.
First Equity Corp. of
Florida v. Utah StatetJn1V'ei?Sity, 544 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1975).
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absence of all jurisdiction."

Bradley v.

Fisher, 80 u.S.335,

351-52, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.483,
498, 16 S.Ct.631, 637 (1896); C.J.S. "Officers" Sections 125127.

Only in the latter case -- i.e., when officials have

acted totally outside the scope of the matters committed to their
control and supervision -- may they be held personally liable.
Thus, it is well established that officials cannot be held
personally liable so long as they act in good faith and within
the scope of the matters committed to their supervision, even though
they may "exceed their authority" through an error in judgment.

Fm

instance, in Anderson v. Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 413
P.2d 597 (196f), several landowners attempted to hold the individual
members of a school board personally liable for official acts taken
in connection with the acquisition of property for a new school, a
matter within the scope of the board members' duties.

Despite allega-!

tions in the landowners' complaint that the school board members had
exceeded their authority, this Court upheld dismissal of that
complaint, stating:
.•. it is the settled policy of the law that when a
public official acts in good faith, believing what
he does to be within the scope of his authority and
in the line of his duty, he is not liable for
damages even if he makes a mistake in the exercise
of his judgment. [footnote omitted]
17 Utah 2d at 407, 413 P.2d at 599.
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Numerous decisions, both in Utah and elsewhere, reflect the
same principle.~/ A good example of the application of that principle
to facts resembling those here is Lister v. Board of Regents of

~/

~' Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367, 369
(1968) (prison warden could not be held personally liable for
negligent supervision so long as he was acting in good faith and
within the scope of his duties); Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah
324, 241 P.2d 907, 909 (1952) (members of Road Commission could not
be held personally liable for damages arising "out of the faithful
and honest performance of their duties"); Board of Education of
Nebo School District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P.1065 (1920)
(county treasurer could not be held liable for erroneous decision
made in good faith); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973)
(university officials--rn-ITtah charged with broad duties could not be
held personally liable for official acts unless malice was shown);
Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557, 559 (D.C.Cir.
1934) (Tax Commissioner could not be held personally liable for
erroneous construction and application of statute, as it was a
matter committed to his control and supervision); Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) ("What is meant by saying
that the officer must be acting within his power cannot be more than
that the occasion must be such as would have justified the act, if
he had been using his power for any of the purposes on whose account
it was vested in him"); Cole v. Tuttle, 366 F.Supp. 1252, 1254
(N.D.Miss. 1973) (prison board officials could not be held individually liable for alleged neglige'nce by Board in administering
prison); Miller v. City and County of San Francisco, 187 Cal.App.2d
480, 483, 9 Cal. Rptr.767 (1960) (city officials misrepresented
to plaintiff that city would take action which the officials
had no power to authorize; held:
no liability because officials
were acting within scope of their employment); Martelli v. Pollack,
162 Cal.App.2d 655, 328 P.2d 795, (1958) (city officials
could not be held personally liable for entering into ultra vires
contract, even though "they may have labored under somemisapprehension as to the scope of their powers"); Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363
Mass. 800, 298 N.E.2d 847 (1973) (city officials who followed
erroneous procedure in removing city manager could not be held
personally liable for errors in exercise of judgment and discretion); w:r;ayv. McMahon, 183Miss. 592, 182 So.99, 100 (1938)
(city officials could not be held personally liable for negligence
or error in appointing police officers); Lister v. Board of Regents
of Universit of Wisconsin S stem, 72 Wis.2d 282, 240, N.W.2d 610,
621-22 (1976
(university officials could not be held personally
liable for damages arising from their allegedly erroneous interpretation of statute and acts in excess of statutory authority).
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University of Wisconsin S:stem, 72 Wis.2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610
(1976).

There, as here, the plaintiff sought to hold university

officials personally liable, claiming that the officals had exceeded their statutory authority.

In affirming dismissal of that

complaint, the Wisconsin Supreme Court statec:
The general rule is that a public officer is not
personally liable to one injured as a result of an
act performed withir. the scope of his Official
authority and in the line of his official duty ..•

* * *
The complaint in tr.is action contains allegations
that [the defendant] miscon:trued or misapplied
sec. 36.16, Stats., thereby ex~eed~ng his autl ~rity
and power under that statu~
It :s clear tha~
the protection afforded by -~e principle of civil
immunity attaches only ~o the consequences of
official conduct and c:es :,ot extend to an
officer's actions as a pr1. ate citizen.
However,
for t;;e purpose of impc:,sing lialility for damages,
a distinction must be ~ade between those acts
which constitute a mistake of judgment within the
officer's lawful authority and those which are
completely outside that authority.
[The defendant's]
conduct in this case clearly falls within the former
category and, therefore, within the scope of the
immunity. [footnotes omitted] 240 N.W.2d at 622.
In the cases presently before the Court, Hornblower sought to
hold Respondents personally liabl•

for discretionary acts which wen

performed in good faith and were within the scope of the matters
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committed to Respondents' supervision and control.~/ As noted above,
Respondents are responsible under the statutes of this State for overseeing the University's financial affairs.
Secs. 53-48-10(5); 53-48-20(3).

Utah Code Annotated,(1970)

The acts for which Hornblower

sought to hold Respondents liable fell squarely within the scope of
the foregoing duties; as such, Respondents are entitled to immunity.
The cases cited in Hornblower's brief do not indicate otherwise.
The primary case upon which Hornblower relies simply illustrates that
the immunity enjoyed by public employees who are performing purely
ministerial duties is narrower than that for public officials who
are performing discretionary duties.
925, 927 (Utah 1977)

Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d

("In this case, the defendant ... was an

employee performing a ministerial act and not a discretionary
act. .. "

[emphasis in original)).

The other cases cited by the

Brokers are equally inapposite . .:_:;
10 / There is no question that Respondents were performing discreTionary acts when they authorized or ratified the investment of
University funds.
At the prompting of the Governor and State
Auditor, Respondents determined that idle University funds could be
best employed by investing them.
Such a decision undoubtedly
required the exercise of judgment on the part of these Respondents.
See Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1977); Board of
Education of Nebo School District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P.
1065, 1069 (1929); Lister v. Board of Regents of Univ. Wis. System,
72 Wis.2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610, 621-22 (1976).

~l; In only two of the other decisions cited by Hornblower were
public officials actually held liable.
The first of those
decisions, Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d 430
(1971), is inapplicable because like the Cornwall case, it
" ... involved a ministerial function only", 25 Utah 2d at 390, 483
P.2d at 432.
The other decision simply held that officials could be
held liable if they acted " ... entirely outside the scope of their
official duties" (emphasis added). Roe v.
Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520,
527, 57 P.2d 1128, 1131 (1936).
Neither decision warrants holding
Respondents liable in this case.
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In summary, Hornblower's third-party complaint could not
allege that Respondents had acted in bad faith or totally beyond the
scope of their duties.

In the absence of such

all~:ations,

no basis for stripping Respondents of their immun.

there is

', as the trial

court properly recognized.

II.

HORNBLOWER'S THIRD-PAR'l'Y COMPLAINT
DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
INDEMNITY OR CONTRIBUTION.

While there is some diversity in the labels which Hornblower has
applied to the causes of action

i~

its third pcrty complaint, the

facts alleged in each count of the third party complaint are
identical.

Hornblower contends that those facts entitle it to

recover either indemnity or contribution from Respondents.
Respondents respectfully submit that the facts alleged in thr

thi~

party complaint are insufficient ':o sus::.ain an action for eit::er
indemnity or contribution for the reasons set forth below, even if
Resondents were not public officials entitled to official immunity.
A.

Hornblower is Barred from Seeking
Indemnity Because It Actively
Participated in the Events Giving
Rise to Liability

Even if Respondents were not public officials entitled to the
b~nefit

of official immunity, Hr.::-nb:..ower' s third-party complaint

would not be sufficient to state a

=aus~

of action for indemnity.

Hornblower would be barred from seeking indemnity, because it
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played an active and essential role in the transactions giving rise
to liability -- buying and selling securities, extending credit, and
receiving commissions.

In light of its active participation, Horn-

blower could not and cannot shift all liability in connection with
those transactions to Respondents.
It is well established that no right to indemnity exists where
a person has actively participated in the events giving rise to
liability.

Bettilyon Construction Co. v. State Road Commission, 20

Utah 2d 319, 437 P.2d 449, 450 (1968); Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah
2d 35, 327 P.2d 822, 826 (1958); Pinal County v. Adams, 13 Ariz.
App. 571, 479 P.2d 718 (1971); William F. Larrick v. Burt

Chevr~

let, Inc., 147 Colo. 133, 362 P.2d 1030 (1961); Bush Terminal Bldgs.
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 9 N.Y.2d 426, 174 N.E.2d 516, 214 N.Y.S.2d
428 (1961).

A right to indemnity will be granted only where an

individual is held vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of
another or where there is so great a difference between the
culpability of two tortfeasors that one of them should be forced to
bear the entire loss.

Cahill Brothers, Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208

Cal.App.2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962); Rio Grande Gas Co. v.
Strahmann Farms, Inc., 80 N.M. 432, 457 P.2d 364 (1969).

See also

Chamberlain v. McCleary, 217 F.Supp. 591, 597 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
Here the facts do not justify shifting Hornblower's liability to
these Respondents.

If Hornblower is held liable to the University, it

will presumably be because it had a duty to determine for itself
whether the University had authority to enter into the transactions
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in question.~/ Yet, if Hornblower has failed to fulfill that
duty, it may not seek indemnity from these Respondents.
these Respondents were charged with a

simi~ar

has vigorously contended, Hornblower and
more than joint

tortfe~sors.

Under those

Even if

duty, as Hornblower

Respo~dents

would be no

ci;~umstances

no action

for indemnity would lie, even under the cases cited by

Hornblower.~/
There is simply no great difference in the culpability ,or

lack of culpability) of Hornblower and Res,r-ondents such as is necessary to justify an indemnity action.

The fact that Hornblower's

knowledge of the limits of the University's powers is merely constructive knowledge does not justify shifting liability for

~ See First Equity Corp. of Florida v.
544 P.26 at 892

~.

ose

Ut~h State University,

See further Rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange imposing a
similar duty upon Hornblower.
2 CCH New York State Exchange Guide,
Paras.2405, 2405.10
~ For example,

in Hoagan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P.512, 514
(1903), the Court noted " .•. 'It is only where a person knows or
must be presumed to know that his act was unlawful, that the law
will refuse to aid him in seeking an indemnity or contribution ... '
We admit the rule that the law will not endorse contribution nor
indemnity between wrongdoers
But that rule aoes not apply to any
case where the act of the asent was not manifestly illegal in itself
and was done bona fide in the execution of his agency and without
knowledge (either actual or implied by law) that it was illegal.··"
[citations omitted; emphasis added))
In order for Hornblower to be held liable to the ~niversity und~r
the principles announced in the First Equity case, Hornblower would
have to be charged with constructive .1rnowledge that the investments
in question were ultra vires.
First Lquity Corp. of FloriGa v. ~
State University, 544 P:2"Cf"at 892.
As the foregoing statement from
the Hoggan case makes clear, such knowledge would bar an action for
indemnity.
See further Trimble v. exchange Bank of Kentucky, 23 ~·
L • Rep • 3 6 7 , 6 2 S . w• 10 2 7 ( 19 O1 ) .
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transactions to Respondents -- for Respondents'
be constructive.

"knowledge" would also

Nor does the fact that Respondents passed resolu-

tions authorizing the opening of accounts with Hornblower justify
holding the Appellees personally liable.
ticated investment house.

Hornblower is a sophis-

It had access to the statutes of this

State and to attorneys who could interpret those statutes for it.
In short, Hornblower played an active and essential role in the
transactions giving rise to liability.

As such, it is barred from

shifting all responsibility for these transactions to Appellees.
B.

Respondents Cannot Be Held Individually
Liable For Warranties Or Representations
Made By The Institutional Council As A Whole

In its brief Hornblower argues that its third-party complaint
states a cause of action for misrepresentation or breach of warranty.
It contends that resolutions passed by the Institutional Council,
authorizing the opening of

accoun~s

with Hornblower,

incorrectly

represented that the University had authority to invest in common

stocks.~/
It matters not whether Hornblower's characterization of the
Council's resolutions is correct.

Even if the resolutions con-

stituted representations or warranties, they were representations or
warranties made by the Institutional Council as a whole and not by
the individual members of the Council.

If Hornblower has a cause of

action for misrepresentation or breach of warranty, it is a claim

~Hornblower Brief, pp. 66-68.
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against the Institutional Council, not against these individual
Respondents.
The foregoing principle has been recognized in similar cases

~e~

attempts have been made to ;old public officials personally liable on
ultra vires contracts which they had entered into on behalf of
public entities.

In a majority of jurisdictions which have con-

sidered the issue, it is held that a public official
personally liable on such a contract.
summarized by a

no~ed

can~

be held

Those decisions have been

commentator as follows:

Ordinarily when an officer or public agent
contracts in good faith with parties having
knowledge of the extent of his authority or
who have equal means of knowledge, especially
where the authority of the officer is prescribed by law, he will not become individually
responsible unless the intent to incur liability
is clearly expressed, although it should be
found that, ~~~ough ignorance of the law, he
may have exceeded his authority.
4 McQuillen, Municipal Corporations, Section 12.214.~/
Here, any warranty or representation was made by the Council u
a whole, not by the individual Respondents.

If HorntJower has a

claim for misrepresentation or breach of warranty,
against the Council.

i~

is a claim

It cannot reasonably be contended that

Respondents made any representations or warranties in their
individual capacities for which they could be held personally
liable.

~ In addition to the d·2cisions cited by Mc2t.::.::. .en see Toronto v.
McBride, 29 U.C.Q.B. 13 (1869)
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c.

Hornblower's Third-Party Comelaint
Did Not State A Cause of Action
For Contribution

In the alternative to its claims for indemnity, Hornblower's
third-party complaint attempted to state a cause of action for
contribution, on the theory that Hornblower and Respondents were
joint tortfeasors (R. 482-483).

However, Hornblower failed to

recognize that there is no right to contribution between joint
tortfeasors in Utah for acts committed prior to May 8, 1973, the
effective date of the Utah Contribution Statute.~ Brunyer v.
Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521 (1976).
In Brunyer, this Court held that the Utah statute governing
contribution between joint tortfeasors has no retroactive effect.
Affirming the dismissal of a third-party complaint, the Court stated,
The contribution statute established a primary
right and duty which was not in existence at
the time the injuries in this case arose, and
the statute not being retroactive by its terms
did not create a right on behalf of the thirdparty plaintiffs. 551 P.2d at 522.
In the cases now before the Court, all the acts on which Hornblower bases its claim for contribution occurred between December,
1971 and September, 1972 prior to the effective date of the contribution statute.

As such, Hornblower's claim for contri-

bution failed to state a cause of action and was properly dismissed.
In its brief Hornblower has contended that under Utah common
law it was entitled to maintain a cause of action for contribution

~/Utah Code Annotated,

(1970) Sec. 78-27-39.
-19-
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bution • ..:2; In support of that contention Hornblower relies upon
dicta in several cases which actually dealt with principles of
indemnity.~ However,

in cases where this Court has actually

dealt with the right to contribution it has expressly held that no
right to contribution existed among joint tortfeasors under the
common law of this State.

For instance, in Hardman v. Matthews,

l Utah 2d 110, 262 P. 2d 748 (Utah 1953), this Court upheld tr, dismissal of a third-party complaint seeking contribution,

stc~ing,

••. contribution cannot be had between jcint
or concurring tort-feasors in a case like
this, unless s~nctioned by statute, there
being none sue~ in Utah.
262 P.2d at 749.

In Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, supra, this Court

again observed, in dismissing a claim for contribution, that
The contribution statute established a
primary right and duty which was not in
existence at the time the injuries in
this case arose.
551 P.2d at 522.
Accordingly, Respondents respectfully submit that the trial
court did not err in dismissing Hornblower's claim for contribution. '

!:!./Hornblower Brief, p. 68.

~/Hornblower Brief, p. 68, Fn. 197.
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III.

IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE UNIVERSITY'S
COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION, IT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM DISMISSAL OF HORNBLOWER'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

These Respondents respectfully submit that Hornblower's thirdparty complaint failed to state a cause of action and was properly
dismissed for the reasons set forth above; however, it should also
be noted that there are other issues presently pending before this
Court, the resolution of which could make a decision on the sufficiency of Hornblower's third-party complaint unnecessary.
In its brief Hornblower has argued, among other things,
that the University's complaint in the primary action failed to
state a cause of action.~

Hornblower contends that (a) the

securities transactions in question were not ultra vires and (b)
that the University should not be permitted to maintain these
actions even if the transactions were ultra vires.
advanced substantial arguments-in

Hornblower has

support of both positions.

If

this Court agrees that the University's complaint in the primary
action failed to state a cause of action, then Respondents submit that
this Court may summarily affirm dismissal of Hornblower's thirdparty complaint without reaching the issues discussed in the foregoing sections of this brief.
Hornblower cannot maintain an action over if it is not held
liable in the first instance.

Under Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of

~/Hornblower Brief, pp. 31-61.
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Civil Procedure, a defendant--third-party plaintiff may only maintain
a claim against a party " •.. who is or may be liable to him for
part of the plaintiff's claim against him."

all~

If Hornblower is not

liable to the University, i.e., the plaintiff, it has no basis for
maintaining a third-party claim against these Appellees under Rule
14.

E.g. Southern Milling Co. v.

U.S., 270 F.2d 80, 84 (5th Cir.

1959). (construing identical provision of federal Rule 14).

("If

there had been no recovery against the appellant-defendant there
could have been no liability on the third-party claim.")~/
Respondents respectfully submit, therefore, that if the
University's complaint against Hornblower falls, Hornblower's
third-party complaint against Respondents r:1ust also fall.

20; It has been suggested in Hornblower's brief that this Court
must rule on the sufficiency of the third-party complaint even if
the Court concludes that the University's complaint failed to state
a cause of action, because Hornblower has included its attorneys
fees among the sums for which it claims indemnity (Hornblower brief,
p. 62).
That contention is erroneous.
Hornblower's attorneys fees
do not constitute a portion of the plaintiffs' claims for which
indemnity could properly be sought under Rule 14.
Nor has Hornblower alleged any facts which suggest in any manner that Respondents
agreed to indemnify Hornblower against liability arising in connection with these transactions.
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CONCLUSION
Hornblower has strenuously argued in its brief that it is
unfair to permit the University to hold it liable in the primary
action, and such a result does, indeed, seem harsh; however, the
harshness of that result would not be lessened by shifting liability
from Hornblower to the individual third-party defendants, who were
simply striving to carry out their official duties in good faith.
Nor does the harshness of that result alter the fact that Hornblower's
third-party complaint failed to state a cause of action against
these individual Respondents.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above in the foregoing
sections of this brief, Respondents submit that the trial court did
not err in dismissing Hornblower's third-party complaint.
Respectfully submitted this

/</"ti. day

of September, 1979.

Lyle W. Hillyard
HILLYARD, LOW & ANDERSON
John W. Morrison
David R. Melton
KARON, MORRISON & SAVIKAS, LTD.
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Attorneys for Appellant and Defendant-Third-Party
Plaintiffs Hornblower & Weeks, Hemphill, Noyes, Inc.
David L. Wilkinson
Office of the Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent-Plaintiff Utah State University
of Agriculture and Applied Science
Darwin C. Hansen
506 South Main, Bountiful. Utah 84010
Attorney for Respondent-Third-Party Defendant
Donald A. Catron
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